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“More a physician than a patient, the writer makes a diagnosis, but what he diag-
noses is the world.” 
Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical 
 
“Young nomads, we love you! Be yet more modern, more mobile, more fluid, if you 
don’t want to end up like your ancestors in the muddy fields of Verdun. The Great 
Market is your draft board! Be light, anonymous, precarious like drops of water or 
soap bubbles: this is true equality, that of the Great Casino of life!” 
Gilles Châtelet, To Live and Think Like Pigs 
 
As Alexander Galloway observes in an essay called “Computers and the Superfold,” Gilles 
Deleuze’s 1990 “Postscript on the Societies of Control” is a highly unusual text, when 
compared to the philosopher’s larger oeuvre: “Such a strange little text” (Galloway 2012: 
513), it is indeed very different from the earlier Deleuze of Difference and Repetition and 
The Logic of Sense, or the Deleuze who wrote the two-volume magnum opus Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia in tandem with Félix Guattari. How to read not only its peculiarity 
within Deleuze’s work as a whole, but also its particularity as a text that belongs to a 
certain genre? Galloway suggests the genre of a manifesto, likely due to its brevity, but 
also because of its straightforwardness, compared to, for instance, its author’s long pas-
sages on the philosophy of time in Difference and Repetition and elsewhere. While Gal-
loway has a point when he argues that “one can discern here some of the most basic re-
quirements of a manifesto, these being an enumeration of grievances and a sermon for 
how to remedy them” (516), I would like to trace the ways in which the “Postscript” may 
be contextualized in terms of Deleuze’s tendency – with and without Guattari, and in fact 
throughout his career – to write diagnoses rather than manifestos (the latter necessarily 
being declarations geared toward public action, the former being conceived as ways of 
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demarcation geared toward private knowing and only occasionally public engagement).1 
“It reads almost like a manifesto, the ‘Manifesto on Control Societies’” (514), Galloway 
proposes, yet it may be more apt to align the “Postscript” – this “strange little text” – 
with the best examples of what may be called Deleuze’s art of diagnosis. 
 Deleuze begins his essay by making a distinction in terms of periodization (another 
important point that Galloway takes note of). Referring to Michel Foucault’s account of 
“the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” – societies that by 
way of an administrative and stratifying force in and of the social realm produced “envi-
ronments of enclosure” – Deleuze writes that “they reach their height at the outset of the 
twentieth” century (Deleuze 1992: 3). Thus paying homage to Foucault’s historico-
analytical insight at the very beginning of his essay, Deleuze nevertheless adds that 
“Foucault recognized […] the transience of this model: it succeeded that of the societies 
of sovereignty, the goal and functions of which were something quite different (to tax 
rather than to organize; to rule on death rather than to administer life)” (3). Along these 
lines, pre-eighteenth century societies were based on necro-normative types of rule, 
while from the 1700s on the social realm has increasingly been defined by the forms of 
bio-political distribution, organization, and compartmentalization (there are echoes of 
Althusser’s state apparatuses here when Deleuze mentions, via Foucault, the specific 
examples of these spaces of enclosure, namely the familial setting or that of the school 
and the factory).  
 What comes after discipline? Deleuze cites William S. Burroughs as the author who 
provides the name of “the new monster” and Paul Virilio as the theorist par excellence of 
“the ultrarapid forms of free-floating control that replaced the old disciplines operating 
in the time frame of a closed system” (1992: 4). One of the things that this trajectory im-
plies is the opening up of the environs of enclosure so that, actually, they bleed into, or 
substitute one another: “Indeed, just as the corporation replaces the factory, perpetual 
training tends to replace the school, and continuous control to replace the examination. 
Which is the surest way of delivering the school over to the corporation” (5). As in Bur-
roughs’ logic, expounded in his more experimental works in the 1960s, control is simul-
taneously control of particular selves in the social realm and of oneself, in both linguistic 
and extra-linguistic registers. Accordingly, in an essay on particular social formations, 
such as the “Postscript,” the question of one period surpassing another (from sovereignty 
to discipline to control) becomes a question of the fate of subjectivity: “The disciplinary 
societies have two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the number or 
administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass. […] In the 
                                                        
1 We might ask, in this respect, to what degree the genre of the manifesto depends on, or presupposes, that 
of the diagnosis, on the level of the social and on the level of theoretical practice. In this regard, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work in the early 1970s might be particularly revealing, as it seems to oscillate between 
diagnostic and programmatic modes of thought. 
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societies of control, on the other hand, what is important is no longer either a signature 
or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the other hand the disciplinary 
societies are regulated by watchwords,” Deleuze writes. And, creating a new concept (the 
dividual), as is the way philosophy ought to function – that is, by creating new concepts 
in relation to site- and time-specific modes of existence, as Deleuze and Guattari have it 
in What Is Philosophy? – Deleuze adds: “The numerical language of control is made of 
codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer find ourselves dealing 
with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, 
data, markets, or ‘banks’” (5). 
 The political thrust of these conceptual pairs – individuals/mass vs. dividu-
als/markets – should not go unnoticed, and Galloway rightfully points out the (renewed) 
Marxist bent in Deleuze’s remarks (Galloway 2012: 514). It is this critical vigor that 
seems different in the wake of Deleuze’s books on Bacon or Leibniz, but which is in fact 
already there in spirit in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus (even if the tone is dif-
ferent). The philosopher’s greatest fear at the onset of the 1990s seems to be the whole-
sale commodification of human (and nonhuman) modes of living and thinking. It is in 
both of these realms that the contemporary transformation of each and every former 
environment of enclosure by the dynamics of corporations had made itself felt, precisely, 
in the most “terrifying” manner: “perpetual training tends to replace the school, and con-
tinuous control to replace the examination. […] We are taught that corporations have a 
soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world” (Deleuze 1992: 5-6).  
 The transactions between the conceptual pairings of individual and dividual masses 
and markets – morphing from discipline to control – go hand in hand with the increasing-
ly accelerated revolution of media technologies, commonly referred to as digitalization. 
Indeed, as others have shown, Deleuze’s piece on control is precisely the “hangover”-
report on what was happening when modes of discipline waned in favor of the fully dig-
itized servitude by each and everybody in the realm of the social, feeding the corpora-
tions’ demands even – or precisely – when not “working.”2 In fact, even if every type of 
formerly enclosed environment that Foucault’s genealogical analyses mentioned, in 
their thoroughly networked version, seemed to contribute to corporations at every mi-
nute, today’s social media (Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and others) have turned out to 
be the fiercely potentiated version of this scenario. While none of this is in any way sur-
prising or contentious, but rather constitutes the scholarly and critical consensus, what 
exactly do I mean by “hangover”-report? Whose and which kind of hangover are we talk-
ing about?  
 When Deleuze writes that “the code is a password [mot de passe], while on the other 
hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords [mots d’ordre]” (5), this oth-
                                                        
2 See, above all, Galloway’s (2004) early take on the “Postscript,” but also Chun 2006. 
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er pairing, only ostensibly less important when compared to the “in/dividual” and the 
“mass/market,” is one that recalls not merely the concepts of coding, decoding, and 
overcoding to be found in the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, but also the 
ending of chapter 4 in A Thousand Plateaus. In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari devel-
op an idiosyncratic theory of language and its speech-acts, in contradistinction to the 
structuralist signifier-signified couple (or “mommy-daddy,” as they have it in Anti-
Oedipus). The theory revolves around the crucial notion of “order-words”: “Language […] 
is the transmission of the word as order-word [mot d’ordre], not the communication of 
the sign as information. […] We call order-words, not a particular category of explicit 
statements (for example, in the imperative), but the relation of every word or every 
statement to implicit presuppositions, in other words, to speech acts that are, and can 
only be accomplished in the statement” (Deleuze/Guattari 2004: 85, 87). Now, in what 
sense is this notion of the order-word key in understanding the difference between 
password and watchword in the “Postscript,” published exactly ten years after A Thou-
sand Plateaus? In the final paragraph of chapter 4, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the 
notion of the “password,” alongside that of the mot d’ordre: “In the order-word, life must 
answer the answer of death, not by fleeing, but by making flight act and create” – put 
differently, these types of words make life resist, rather than evaporate. Deleuze and 
Guattari go on by claiming: “There are pass-words beneath order-words. Words that 
pass, words that are components of passage, whereas order-words mark stoppages or 
organized, stratified compositions. A single thing or word undoubtedly has this twofold 
nature: it is necessary to […] transform the compositions of order into components of 
passage” (122). What I mean by “hangover” is precisely the sentiment in Deleuze’s 1990 
“Postscript” or “P.S.” – itself a refined genre in the digital age, championed by the “con-
strained writing” of Twitter culture, above all – that the ethical championing of the 
“password”-side of words or things has not been as beneficial as it was deemed to be in 
the 1970s, when the second tome of Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
was conceived. Passage, productivity, and nomad science – if the flexibility of individual 
lives, as opposed to the rigidities and homogeneities of the majoritarian order-word, still 
held some promise before the 1980s, by the time the “Postscript” was written and even-
tually published, Deleuze’s judgment concerning the promise of “components of pas-
sage” or fluidity in things and words alike has changed drastically: the (thought) experi-
ment in nomadology seems to have gone sour.  
 The notion of “judgment” at this point in my remark on the “Postscript” is important, 
since it brings me to the distinction between the genres of manifesto and diagnosis. Gal-
loway contends that manifestos are about accounting for the “grievances” of a particular 
situation in the realm of the social (or the aesthetic or the political), and about creating 
an agenda for the – at least provisional – solution to the problem, or what he calls “a 
sermon for how to remedy [these] grievances” (2012: 516). Yet, if Deleuze writes that 
“There is no need to ask which is the toughest or most tolerable regime, for it’s within 
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each of them that liberating and enslaving forces confront one another;” and that “There 
is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons” (1992: 4), is this really 
about concrete ways to go about the grievances listed previously? Is Deleuze really say-
ing, “the snake is even worse than the mole” (Galloway 2012: 515), when he claims, in 
the closing sentence: “The coils of a serpent are even more complex than the burrows of 
a molehill” (Deleuze 1992: 7)? Put simply, is a “more complex” situation a situation that 
is simply “worse” for Deleuze?3 
 I read Deleuze’s short essay on control societies as a diagnosis rather than a mani-
festo. The former, according to the OED the “determination of the nature of a diseased 
condition” and the “identification of a disease by careful investigation of its symptoms 
and history,” and etymologically derived from the Greek diagignōskein – “to distinguish, 
discern” – is precisely the type of genre even Deleuze’s seemingly apolitical writings ad-
here to. His writings generally have a diagnostic quality: sometimes they are discerning 
portraits of thinkers whose works the philosopher taps into and transforms; at other 
times, they are directly critical symptomatologies of art, science, and culture in terms of 
the “twofold nature” of every “thing or word” (Deleuze 2004: 122): namely, the molar 
and the molecular, major science and minor science, the sedentary and the nomadic, 
and, finally, order and passage. There is yet another sense in which Deleuze’s work is 
directly linked to a particular understanding of diagnosis, which, in fact, is most appar-
ent in an essay he wrote for the French newspaper Libération (published in 1989, that is, 
one year before the “Postscript”); an essay that recapitulates the theses of his 1967 book 
on Leopold von Sacher-Masoch.4 In this text, Deleuze writes: “More a physician than a 
patient, the writer makes a diagnosis, but what he diagnoses is the world; he follows the 
illness step by step, but it is the generic illness of man; he assesses the chances of health, 
but it is the possible birth of a new man” (1997: 53). While Galloway is right in saying 
that the “Postscript” is in fact a strangely political text in comparison with his more 
somber philosophical portraits, such as The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988), this 
does not make his 1990 piece, which ultimately takes stock of the media-technological 
situation or (in Marxist terms) the “conjuncture” around the late 1980s and early 90s, a 
manifesto that accounts for pressing issues and then lists the ways in which to go about 
them. Rather, Deleuze’s likely self-referential ascription of a diagnostic character to “the 
writer” in his essay on Sacher-Masoch might be connected to the function of the “Post-
script”: discerning the complex social and technological trajectories from discipline to 
control, and recognizing that the critique of arborescence – so powerful in the two pre-
                                                        
3 Deleuze’s animist mythography is used to illustrate the passing from disciplinary society to that of con-
trol: “The old monetary mole is the animal of the spaces of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the socie-
ties of control. We have passed from one animal to the other, from the mole to the serpent, in the system 
under which we live, but also in our manner of living and on our relations with others” (Deleuze 1992: 5). 
See, especially on this animist metaphorics, Bogard 2007. 
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ceding decades – ought to be revised and refined. After all, in What Is Philosophy? 
Deleuze and Guattari write: “The diagnosis of becomings in every passing present is 
what Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as physician, ‘physician of civilization,’ or 
inventor of new immanent modes of existence” (1994: 113) – clearly one of the most 
revealing and crucial descriptions of their enterprise. If I noted earlier that manifestos 
are strictly public enterprises, whereas diagnoses are not necessarily so, the latter are 
nonetheless ethico-aesthetic acts: they have purchase on the ways in which types of 
knowing and kinds of living come to coalesce in a shared, if troubled space of “immanent 
modes of existence.” Philosophy, for Deleuze and Guattari, is the thoroughly and perpet-
ually creative activity of discernment that turns to site-and time-specific problems in 
and of the world at particular points in time; yet it turns to those problems for a world 
outside of the apparatuses of both capture and (in)corporation. In this sense, a diagnos-
tic philosophy in Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding is both an act in time and a pro-
cess in the making. 
 To return to Deleuze’s indirect interlocutors: Galloway is also right in mentioning 
the close connection between Deleuze’s 1990 text and his portrait of his fellow diagnos-
tician in the 1986 book, Foucault, which, unlike The Fold, anticipates the periodization 
from sovereignty, via discipline, to control.5 Notwithstanding Burroughs’ and Virilio’s 
importance for Deleuze’s thinking, it is indeed Foucault whose example Deleuze recon-
siders throughout the 1980s in an effort to rethink some of the assumptions made in his 
own work and in the works written together with Guattari. Will the molecular always be 
on the side of resistance, holding fast in an effort to shore off the disciplinary enclosures 
of the molar? 
 One term, however, remains crucial: “Life,” considered as “resistance to power when 
power takes life as its object” (Deleuze 1988: 92). Power, in this context, gradually be-
comes synonymous with corporate identity and with what another diagnostician and 
friend of Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari called “the stifling of politics by the insatiable 
quest for self-improvement” (Châtelet 2014: 65) in his unflinching and dissecting 1998 
bestseller To Live and Think Like Pigs: The Incitement of Envy and Boredom in Market 
Democracies. Citing Deleuze’s “Postscript” favorably as an example of resistance in the 
face of “the generalized offensive of management and the managerial spirit” (146), the 
philosopher-mathematician Gilles Châtelet also homes in on the commodification of any 
vitalist tendencies in and by the business sector. He thus denounces the appropriation of 
philosophies of life by corporations, which may be seen in parallel with, or as a resound-
                                                        
5 Consider also Deleuze and Guattari’s note on Foucault in their last collaborative work, where they write 
that “When Foucault admires Kant for posing the problem of philosophy in relation not to the eternal but 
to the Now, he means that the object of philosophy is not to contemplate the eternal or to reflect history 
but to diagnose our actual becomings” (1994: 112, emphasis added).  
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ing of, Deleuze and Guattari’s 1991 critique, in What Is Philosophy?, of how marketplace 
logistics would hijack the philosophical practice – and ethos – of creating new concepts.6   
 And it is with a diatribe from the beginning of a chapter hilariously titled “Market 
Democracy will be Fluid or will not be at all: Fluid Nomads and Viscous Losers,” in            
Châtelet’s  book, which seems to evoke a Burroughsian poetics, that I want to close this 
remark on Deleuze’s “Postscript.” This is because that passage accurately, and thus un-
cannily, gives voice to the anxiety regarding the social condition of corporations and the 
notion of their purported psyche, this “most terrifying news” of all (Deleuze 1992: 5-6): 
Young nomads, we love you! Be yet more modern, more mobile, more fluid, if you 
don’t want to end up like your ancestors in the muddy fields of Verdun. The Great 
Market is your draft board! Be light, anonymous, precarious like drops of water or 
soap bubbles: this is true equality, that of the Great Casino of life! (Châtelet 2014: 
75) 
The market democracies of the societies of control are not worse than those that came 
before them, yet, as Deleuze, Guattari, and Châtelet agree, the conceptual weapons need 
adjustment. This is also one of the reasons why the creation of concepts ought to never 
cease, cautious as philosophy should be to the proposals of the corporate world’s “gim-
crack immanence” (Châtelet 2014: 65). In this sense, once again, Deleuze’s “Postscript” 
may be interpreted as one of the most trenchant demonstrations of his art of diagnosis. 
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